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                      OPINION OF THE COURT 
          ____________________________________________ 
 
 
NORRIS, Circuit Judge: 
 
         In 1988, Alexander E. Moskovits was convicted by a jury 
of various narcotics offenses related to the possession and 
distribution of cocaine.  He was sentenced by Judge Louis H. 
Pollak to fifteen years imprisonment.  Judge Pollak later 
granted Moskovits's  2255 motion to vacate the conviction on the 
ground that Moskovits's trial counsel was ineffective, United 
States v. Moskovits, 844 F. Supp. 202 (E.D. Pa. 1993), and 
granted Moskovits's request to represent himself at the new 
trial.  Moskovits was again convicted and sentenced by Judge 
Clarence C. Newcomer to a prison term of twenty years, five 
years longer than the sentence imposed by Judge Pollak. 
         On appeal, Moskovits contends that his conviction must 
be set aside on either of two grounds: (1) that his right to 
testify in his own defense was abridged by the conditions imposed 
on the format of his testimony, and (2) that he did not knowingly 
and intelligently waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  
Moskovits also contends that, even if the conviction is affirmed, 
the case must be remanded for resentencing because his sentence 
was based on impermissible considerations.  We affirm the 
conviction but remand for resentencing. 
 
                                I 
         Moskovits contends that his conviction must be set 
aside because the district court imposed unreasonable conditions 
on his right to testify in his own defense.  He argues that 
these conditions were so onerous that he had no choice but to 
forgo his right to testify. 
         We express no view on the propriety of the conditions 
imposed by Judge Newcomer because Moskovits, by electing not to 
testify, failed to preserve this issue for appeal.  Because 
Moskovits did not testify, any possible harm flowing from the 
conditions imposed by Judge Newcomer is speculative and cannot be 
evaluated in relation to the record as a whole.  Accordingly, we 
decline to set Moskovits's conviction aside on this ground.  SeeLuce v. 
United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41-42 (1984) (defendant must 
testify in order to raise and preserve the claim of improper 
impeachment with a prior conviction); United States v. Romano, 
849 F.2d 812, 815-16 (3d Cir. 1988) (when defendant refuses to 
testify, the harm flowing from an in limine order is merely 
speculative and, thus, not a basis for reversing a conviction); 
United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110, 1116-17 (1st Cir. 1989), 
cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1005 (1990) (defendant who does not 
testify may not challenge ruling regarding the scope of 
permissible cross-examination). 
 
                               II 
         Moskovits also seeks a new trial on the ground that the 
colloquy with the district court at the time he waived his right 
to counsel was thoroughly "deficient."  In fact, as the 
government points out, Judge Pollak conducted a lengthy and 
detailed colloquy that was, in all respects but one, a model of 
thoroughness.  Judge Pollak set out the dangers and difficulties 
of proceeding pro se, stating that it would be "an imprudent 
course" and that Moskovits would be doing himself "a very very 
grave disservice."  App. at 41.  Judge Pollak spelled out the 
cumbersome procedures Moskovits would have to follow to maintain 
the distinction between his roles as lawyer and defendant.  He 
endorsed the Assistant United States Attorney's statement that 
Moskovits would lose the benefit of the advice of counsel 
regarding the most effective way to present his case to the  
jury.  Judge Pollak also appointed stand-by counsel.  
Nonetheless, it is undisputed that punishment was not discussed 
at the waiver hearing.  In particular, Judge Pollak did not 
inform Moskovits of the range of punishments he faced on retrial. 
         For a waiver of the right to counsel to be "knowing[] 
and intelligent[]," which it must be in order to be valid, the 
defendant "should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages 
of self-representation, so that the record will establish that 
'he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes 
open.'" Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975).  To 
ensure that a defendant "truly appreciates the 'dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation,' . . . '[a defendant's] 
waiver must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the 
charges, the statutory offenses included within them, [and] the 
range of allowable punishments thereunder.'"  United States v. 
Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 188 (3d Cir. 1981) (quoting Faretta, 422 
U.S. at 835, and Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724 (1948) 
(plurality)) (emphasis added); see also Singer v. Court of Common 
Pleas, 879 F.2d 1203, 1210 (3d Cir. 1989) (no waiver where court 
failed to inform defendant of range of punishment he might be 
exposed to); McMahon v. Fulcomer, 821 F.2d 934, 945 (3d Cir. 
1987) (same); Piankhy v. Cuyler, 703 F.2d 728, 731 (3d. Cir. 
1983) (same). 
         The government concedes that Moskovits was not advised 
during the waiver hearing that he faced the possibility of an 
increase in the fifteen-year sentence that had been originally 
imposed by Judge Pollak, but argues that his waiver of his right 
to counsel was knowing and intelligent because the record shows 
that he was aware of this possibility at the time of the waiver 
hearing.  The government frames its argument as follows:  "[T]he 
record establishes that although not specifically advised of the 
possibility of an increased sentence at the waiver hearing before 
Judge Pollak, Moskovits understood that possibility before the 
trial commenced before Judge Newcomer."  Appellee's Brief at 16.  
In making this argument, the government relies on the record of 
proceedings both before and after the waiver hearing conducted by 
Judge Pollak. 
         The government relies on United States v. McFadden, 630 
F.2d 963 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1043 (1981), for 
the proposition that if the defendant has otherwise been made 
aware of the range of punishment he faced, the court is not 
required to notify him again at the time he waives his right to 
counsel.  McFadden, however, is distinguishable on its facts in a 
material respect.  In McFadden, the record was clear that the 
defendant was aware of the range of punishment he faced when he  
waived his right to counsel.  As this court said, "[t]he nature 
of the charges and the range of punishment had been pointed out 
in McFadden's two initial appearances before a magistrate." Id.at 972. 
         Here the record is not at all clear that Moskovits had 
been made aware when he waived his right to counsel before Judge 
Pollak that the original 15-year sentence would not serve as a 
ceiling on the sentence he could receive in the event he was 
convicted again.  The government cites the Pre-Sentence 
Investigation Reports (PIRs) that were prepared when Moskovits 
was originally sentenced and resentenced.  In relying on these 
PIRs as evidence that Moskovits was aware that he faced the 
possibility of an increased sentence if found guilty a second 
time, the government assumes, implicitly, that Moskovits either 
read and understood the PIRs or that counsel then representing 
him explained to him that the maximum sentences set forth in the 
PIRs could be imposed in spite of the fact that Moskovits's 
sentence would then exceed the 15-year sentence originally 
imposed.  The government cites no record support for either 
assumption, and we have found none.  Thus there is no record 
support, as there was in McFadden, for imputing to Moskovits 
knowledge at the time he waived his right to counsel that the 
original 15-year sentence would not act as a ceiling on his 
punishment.  Accordingly, we see no basis for inferring that 
Moskovits was aware from the mere existence of the PIRs that he 
was facing the possibility of an increased sentence if found 
guilty a second time, particularly given our mandate to "indulge 
in every reasonable presumption against waiver" of the right to 
counsel.  Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977). 
         The government also cites a conference in Judge 
Newcomer's chambers six or seven days before the start of the 
retrial as evidence that Moskovits was aware at the waiver 
hearing before Judge Pollak five months earlier that he faced the 
possibility of a twenty-year sentence.  The extract from the 
transcript of the in-chambers conference relied upon by the 
government reads as follows:  
    THE COURT:  Okay.  Now, my understanding of the law, and I 
    mention this at the outset so that everybody knows my view 
    of the law on this matter, and if you disagree with it that 
    you will then have an opportunity to furnish me with the 
    authority for your stance, is that this sentence having been 
    vacated and a new trial being granted, we are in an entirely 
    new ballgame.  And this matter is like a new case coming 
    before me for trial for sentence with the power vested in 
    the presiding judge to determine, if appropriate, if there 
    should be a conviction the sentence that would be 
    applicable. 
 
    I understand this case preceded the guidelines, is that  
    right? 
 
    THE GOVERNMENT: That is correct, your Honor. 
 
    THE COURT:  And therefore this case will not be sentenced  
    under the guidelines, is that correct? 
 
    THE GOVERNMENT:  That would be -- 
 
    THE COURT:  If there should be a conviction.  All right.  
    Now, if anybody disagrees with that, please feel free to  
                   tell me but give me your authority for it 
because I've       satisfied myself from independent research 
here in chambers   that that's the case. 
 
    MR. MOSKOVITS:  Your Honor. 
 
    THE COURT:  Yes, sir. 
 
    MR. MOSKOVITS:  With all due respect.  If I understand the  
    law correctly, there's two cases that come to mind.  One of  
    them is not -- 
 
    THE COURT:  If there are, you can do this in writing. 
 
    MR. MOSKOVITS: Oh, in writing? 
 
    THE COURT:  Yes. 
 
    MR. MOSKOVITS:  Thank you, sir. 
 
    THE COURT:  I want -- for a matter that important, I would  
    much prefer to have you do it.  It doesn't have to be fancy  
    and certainly not long, but I'd like specifically to have  
    your authority so that I can, you know, search it out  carefully. 
 
    MR. MOSKOVITS:  Thank you, your Honor. 
 
App. at 62-64. 
 
         While it is true that Judge Newcomer said he would have 
a free hand at sentencing because the retrial would be like a new 
case coming before him, he did not say anything about his 
authority to impose a sentence longer than fifteen years.  
Moreover, even if Moskovits's response to Judge Newcomer 
indicates "that Moskovits himself recognized the possibility of 
an increased sentence and had conducted legal research in an 
attempt to determine the limits of the court's authority,"  as 
the government argues, Appellee's Brief at 15, Moskovits's 
waiver of his right to counsel would still be defective.  For a 
waiver of counsel to be valid, the defendant must be aware of the 
dangers of self-representation at the time of the waiver.  Welty, 
674 F.2d at 188-89 ("to be valid [a defendant's] waiver must be 
made with an apprehension of . . . the range of allowable 
punishments") (quoting Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724 
(1948) (plurality)); McFadden, 630 F.2d at 979 n.10 (Adams, J., 
dissenting) ("Von Moltke makes clear [that] a defendant's waiver 
of the right to counsel is made knowingly only if he apprehends 
the charges and possible punishments at the time the waiver is 
made."). 
         On this point, the government's reliance on McFadden, 
630 F.2d at 963, is again misplaced.  In McFadden, the record 
established that the defendant was aware at the time of the 
waiver hearing of the range of punishments he faced because he 
had been given this information during earlier appearances before 
a magistrate.  Here, in contrast, the government is asking us to 
impute knowledge to Moskovits at the waiver hearing before Judge 
Pollak on the basis of a proceeding that took place five months 
after the hearing.  In other words, the government is asking us 
to extend McFadden beyond its holding and infer that a defendant 
had knowledge at a waiver hearing on the basis of proceedings 
that occurred five months later.  This we decline to do, lest we 
fail to "indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of 
fundamental constitutional rights."  Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 
458, 464 (1938). 
         The question we now consider is the appropriate remedy 
for the failure to inform Moskovits that he could receive a 
sentence longer than his originally imposed sentence of fifteen 
years.  The Supreme Court has recognized that "[c]ases involving 
Sixth Amendment deprivations are subject to the general rule that 
remedies should be tailored to the injury suffered from the 
constitutional violation and should not unnecessarily infringe on 
competing interests," such as, "the necessity for preserving 
society's interest in the administration of criminal justice 
. . . .  Our approach has thus been to identify and then 
neutralize the taint by tailoring relief appropriate in the 
circumstances to assure the defendant . . . a fair trial."  
United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364-65 (1980). 
         Although the record does not tell us that Moskovits was 
aware at the time of his waiver hearing that he could be 
sentenced to a term longer than fifteen years if found guilty a 
second time, Moskovits certainly knew that he could again receive 
a fifteen-year sentence if found guilty at the retrial.  Indeed, 
Moskovits admits that he knew at the time he waived his right to 
counsel that he could again be sentenced to a fifteen-year term.  
Appellant's Brief at 6 ("the prior resentencing provided strong 
support for Mr. Moskovits's understanding that the recently 
vacated sentence would have served as a ceiling at any 
re-sentencing following a re-conviction").  As Moskovits's own 
attorney stressed at the waiver hearing, Moskovits was "ultra 
bright" and knowledgeable about the case. 
         Because Moskovits knew at his waiver hearing that he 
could be sentenced a second time to a fifteen-year term, the only 
prejudice he could conceivably suffer from the deprivation of his 
Sixth Amendment right is a sentence greater than fifteen years.  
Accordingly, the appropriate remedy for the deprivation is to 
affirm the conviction but impose a fifteen-year ceiling on 
Moskovits's sentence.  Cf. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 374 
(1979) (although the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to 
counsel during a misdemeanor prosecution, failure to provide 
counsel is not unconstitutional as long as the defendant is not 
punished by imprisonment, even if imprisonment is authorized by 
statute); United States v. Reilley, 948 F.2d 648, 654 (10th Cir. 
1991) (striking down portion of sentence imposed on uncounseled 
misdemeanor defendant that involved conditionally suspended term 
of imprisonment but affirming portion of sentence involving a 
fine); United States v. White, 529 F.2d 1390, 1394 (8th Cir. 
1976) (upholding conviction but vacating suspended prison 
sentence imposed on misdemeanor defendant who did not waive right 
to counsel). 
         The twenty-year sentence imposed by Judge Newcomer is 
vacated and the case is remanded for resentencing. 
 
                               III 
         We now turn to Moskovits's claims of error at the 
sentencing phase of the retrial.  Judge Newcomer gave a number of 
reasons for the twenty-year sentence he imposed, among which were 
the serious nature of the crimes, Moskovits's prior involvement 
in the transportation and distribution of cocaine, Moskovits's 
poor prospects for rehabilitation, and Moskovits's lack of 
remorse and failure to accept responsibility for his crimes, as 
evidenced--among other things--by Moskovits's refusal to accept 
the government's plea offer.  In addition, Judge Newcomer 
specifically cited his finding that Moskovits committed perjury 
at the evidentiary hearing on his  2255 petition as a 
justification for imposing a sentence that was greater than the 
fifteen-year sentence originally imposed.  Moskovits argues that 
his case must be remanded for resentencing because Judge Newcomer 
(A) acted with actual vindictiveness when he imposed a harsher 
sentence after the retrial, (B) improperly punished Moskovits for 
refusing to plead guilty, and (C) erred when he found that 
Moskovits had committed perjury at the  2255 hearing before 
Judge Pollak and considered this finding at sentencing.  We 
address each of these arguments in turn. 
 
                                A 
         Moskovits does not attempt to invoke the presumption of 
vindictiveness that normally arises when a harsher sentence is 
imposed after a retrial.  See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 
711, 725-26 (1969).  Nor could he.  We have held that a harsher 
sentence imposed after a retrial is not presumed to be vindictive 
if it is imposed by a "judge who . . . ha[d] no material contact 
with the initial trial or sentence and 'provides an 
on-the-record, wholly logical, non-vindictive reason for the 
harsher sentence.'" Rock v. Zimmerman, 959 F.2d 1237, 1257-58 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (en banc) (quoting Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 
140 (1986)).  Judge Newcomer had no contact whatsoever with 
Moskovits's initial trial and set out, on the record, plausible 
reasons for the harsher sentence he imposed. 
         Moskovits instead argues that the harsher sentence 
imposed by Judge Newcomer resulted from actual vindictiveness.  
The only proof of Judge Newcomer's actual vindictiveness offered 
by Moskovits is Judge Newcomer's statement that if he "were to 
sentence Moskovits to the same sentence that he originally 
received, it would countenance frivolous Section 2255 claims and 
encourage defendants to file them in hopes of gaining a reduced 
sentence long after their time to file Rule 35 motions had 
expired."  App. at 135.  According to Moskovits, Judge Newcomer's 
characterization of his successful  2255 petition as "frivolous" 
reflects the actual vindictiveness with which he imposed 
sentence.  We are, however, not persuaded that this statement 
alone is enough to establish actual vindictiveness, particularly 
in light of the numerous other, logical reasons Judge Newcomer 
stated for imposing the twenty-year sentence. 
 
                                B 
         After Judge Pollak granted Moskovits a new trial, the 
government offered a plea bargain involving a sentence no greater 
than time served.  Moskovits's rejection of this offer was a 
factor considered by Judge Newcomer when he imposed the 
twenty-year sentence.  As Judge Newcomer explained, "[t]o me, 
[Moskovits's] refusal to accept the plea is further evidence of 
his lack of remorse and failure to take responsibility for his 
crimes."  App. at 137. 
         We agree with Moskovits that Judge Newcomer erred when 
he considered as a sentencing factor Moskovits's decision to 
exercise his constitutional right to a trial by jury rather than 
accept the government's plea offer. United States v. Jackson, 390 
U.S. 570, 581-82 (1968) (invalidating death sentence under 
Federal Kidnapping Act because it could be imposed only upon a 
defendant who elected a jury trial, whereas the maximum penalty 
that could be imposed on a defendant waiving this right was life 
imprisonment); Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 223 (1978) 
(upholding statute that allows judge to exercise leniency by 
choosing a lesser sentence for murder defendants who pleaded non 
vult); United States v. Paramo, 998 F.2d 1212, 1219 (3d Cir. 
1993) (prosecutor may not refrain from filing a motion necessary 
for a downward departure because the defendant elected to go to 
trial), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1076 (1994). 
         The government argues that Judge Newcomer's comment, 
quoted above, does not show that he was penalizing Moskovits for 
having elected to go to trial but rather merely expresses Judge 
Newcomer's view that Moskovits had been unwise to reject the plea 
offer.  The government also asserts, without explanation, that 
Judge Newcomer was not punishing Moskovits for exercising his 
right to go to trial, but was merely withholding leniency.  These 
arguments are implausible, however, in light of the fact that 
Judge Newcomer made his comment in the context of setting out his 
reasons for the harsher sentence he was imposing. 
                                C 
         Moskovits argues that Judge Newcomer also committed 
error in basing his twenty-year sentence on a finding of fact 
that Moskovits committed perjury at the evidentiary hearing held 
on his  2255 petition.  Judge Newcomer's finding of perjury was 
based upon his reading of the transcript of Moskovits's  2255 
testimony before Judge Pollak, considering the testimony of the 
government's witnesses, and concluding that the version of the 
facts to which Moskovits testified was contradicted by the 
verdicts of the juries at his original trial and retrial.  As 
Judge Newcomer put it, "[t]he proof that Moskovits perjured 
himself lies in the fact that two juries listened to the 
identical evidence [that Moskovits denied at the  2255 hearing] 
and convicted him."  App. at 132. 
         Moskovits argues that Judge Newcomer's finding of 
perjury was improper because it was not made independently of the 
juries' verdicts.  Moskovits relies on United States v. Dunnigan, 
113 S. Ct. 1111 (1993), which holds that a district court that  
enhances a sentence because the defendant committed perjury must 
"review the evidence and make independent findings necessary to 
establish a willful impediment to or obstruction of justice."  
Id. at 1117 (interpreting federal sentencing guidelines).  In 
other words, the sentencing judge must have a basis for his 
finding of perjury that is "independent" of the jury verdict. 
         In response, the government asserts that Judge Newcomer 
independently considered the testimony of the witnesses for the 
prosecution at the retrial, recognized that the juries by their 
verdicts had found these witnesses' version of the facts to be 
true beyond a reasonable doubt, and concluded that Moskovits 
committed perjury when he testified at the  2255 hearing to a 
contradictory version of the facts. 
         We are satisfied that Judge Newcomer did not err when 
he made a finding that Moskovits committed perjury at the  2255 
hearing.  Judge Newcomer explained on the record that there were 
"numerous occasions on both direct and cross-examination [when] 
Moskovits testified that he did not take the specific criminal 
actions which the Government's evidence established that he did 
take."  App. at 132.  Judge Newcomer specifically cited 
Moskovits's testimony that he did not receive phone calls from 
one of his alleged co-conspirators while he was in prison in 
Mexico, which was contradicted by the co-conspirator's testimony 
and phone bills; his testimony that there was an innocent 
explanation for his actions in connection with a package of 
cocaine, which was contradicted by the testimony of five 
government witnesses; his denial that he directed two 
co-conspirators to travel to South America and purchase cocaine 
there, which was contradicted by the co-conspirators' testimony; 
his disavowal of ownership of a machine gun, which was 
contradicted by the testimony of four government witnesses; and 
his assertion that eight tape recordings of telephone 
conversations with a co-conspirator did not relate to drug 
transactions, which was contradicted by the testimony of the 
co-conspirator and two other government witnesses.  App. at 
132-34. 
         Although Judge Newcomer was not present at the hearing 
and thus not in a position to observe Moskovits's testimony, 
Dunnigan leaves open the possibility of finding all the elements 
of perjury -- falsity, materiality, and willfulness -- when there 
are "numerous witnesses who contradicted [the defendant] 
regarding so many facts on which [he] could not have been 
mistaken."  Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct. at 1117.  See also United States 
v. Boggi, 74 F.3d 470, 478-79 (3d Cir. 1996) (upholding 
sentencing judge's finding of perjury under the Sentencing 
Guidelines, in part by reference to facts implicit in the jury's 
verdict).  Moreover, because Judge Newcomer was sentencing 
Moskovits under the pre-Sentencing Guidelines regime, he had 
broad discretion to consider any and all information about 
Moskovits's relevant conduct and to determine what effect, if 
any, that information would have on the sentence.  See United 
States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 51 (1977) (upholding sentencing 
enhancement in pre-Guidelines case on sentencing judge's view, 
based on government's rebuttal evidence and cross-examination, 
that the defendant committed perjury during trial); United States 
v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972) (in pre-Guidelines case, 
"before making [the sentencing] determination, a judge may 
appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely 
unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, 
or the source from which it may come"). 
         The conviction is AFFIRMED.  The twenty-year sentence 
imposed by Judge Newcomer is VACATED and the case is REMANDED for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. ALEXANDER EUGENIO MOSKOVITS 
NOS. 94-1990 AND 95-1048                                 
STAPLETON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: 
    I join sections I and III of the court's opinion, although I 
believe that a more detailed explanation is warranted regarding 
section III-B.  I cannot join section II.   
 
                               I. 
    In section II, the court concludes that Moskovits' waiver of 
his right to counsel cannot be said to be knowing and intelligent 
because the record fails to show that he was aware at the waiver 
hearing that his sentence after retrial could be greater than his 
vacated sentence.  I agree that Moskovits could not knowingly and 
intelligently waive the right to counsel without knowing that he 
had something to lose in a retrial.  Further, I agree that 
Moskovits was not advised at the waiver hearing that he could 
face a greater sentence after retrial.   
The record does affirmatively establish, however, that this 
advice would not have altered Moskovits' decision to represent  
himself and, accordingly, that the failure to give it had no 
effect on the subsequent course of events.  Under these 
circumstances, I find no basis for disturbing Moskovits' 
conviction. 
    When Moskovits indicated a desire to represent himself, 
Judge Pollak spoke at length and in depth with him about his 
right to counsel and the dangers of self-representation.  
Moskovits acknowledges that Judge Pollak "touched all the bases" 
save the one he now stresses.  Only after Moskovits insisted that 
he understood the advantages of counsel and the disadvantages of 
self-representation did Judge Pollak agree to let Moskovits take 
the lead role in his own defense.  In order to provide assistance 
to Moskovits, however, and to protect against prejudice to him in 
the event he should thereafter have a change of heart, Judge 
Pollak appointed two back-up counsel who would be prepared to 
consult and to take over at any point.  This is of crucial 
importance to the issue before us because Moskovits was expressly 
advised a week before the retrial that he could receive a higher 
sentence and he chose once again to reject representation and opt 
for self-representation.  Given that Moskovits had and rejected 
the option of effective professional representation after 
learning what he had at stake, it involves no speculation to 
conclude that Moskovits would have chosen self-representation 
following a flawless waiver hearing and that the deficiency to 
which he now points had no effect on these proceedings.  Limiting 
Moskovits' sentence under these circumstances would constitute a 
windfall, pure and simple. 
   I am mindful that "[s]ome constitutional violations  
. . . by their very nature cast so much doubt on the fairness of 
the trial process that, as a matter of law, they can never be 
considered harmless."  Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 256 
(1988).  Such is the case where "any inquiry into a claim of 
harmless error . . . would require, unlike most cases, unguided 
speculation."  Id. (quoting Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 
491 (1978).  Accordingly, this court has refused to speculate on 
whether representation throughout trial for a criminal defendant 
would have produced a result different from that achieved by the 
defendant without representation.  It is simply impossible to 
tell what a skilled and fully informed counsel would have been 
able to accomplish during the representation.  See United States 
v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 194 n.6 (3d Cir. 1982).  On the other 
hand, the general rule remains that a criminal conviction should 
not be overturned if there is no causal connection between the 
judgment and the alleged constitutional error.  Even where the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been infringed, an 
affirmance is in order if the "scope [of the error] is readily 
identifiable" and "the reviewing court can undertake with some 
confidence its relatively narrow task of assessing the likelihood 
that the error materially affected" the outcome.  Satterwhite, 
486 U.S. at 256 (quoting Holloway, 435 U.S. at 490). 
   Determining that there was no causal connection here between 
the alleged constitutional error and Moskovits' conviction 
involves no speculation.  On the contrary, the record establishes 
with certainty that the district court's failure to advise 
Moskovits at the waiver hearing of the range of penalties he 
faced did not affect Moskovits' decision to represent himself, 
and hence did not in any way affect the subsequent course of 
events. 
 
                               II. 
   In part III-B, the court concludes that the district court 
did not err when it sentenced Moskovits in part based on its 
finding that Moskovits committed perjury at the habeas hearing.  
While I believe that the court's discussion is fully consistent 
with my interpretation of United States v. Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct. 
1111 (1993), in my view, a more detailed explanation is 
warranted. 
   Dunnigan stands for two propositions.  First, in order for a 
district court to enhance a sentence for perjury pursuant to 
United States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G.")  3C1.1, the 
district court must review the record and find by a preponderance 
of the evidence that each of the elements of perjury 
(willfulness, falsity, and materiality) is present.  The district 
court cannot assume that a defendant has perjured herself merely 
because she has testified at trial and was found guilty.  Because 
the sentencing court must make affirmative findings with respect 
to each element of perjury, its conclusion is "independent" of 
the jury verdict.  Id.  Second, when a court enhances the 
sentence of a defendant who testified at trial in accordance with 
this procedure, the court does not violate the defendant's right 
to testify at trial on her own behalf.  Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct. at 
1117-19.   
   It is important to realize that while a court, under 
Dunnigan, must make "independent findings" with respect to each 
perjury element, this does not mean that the jury's verdict may 
not play a role in this fact finding process.  Just as a jury 
verdict has issue preclusive effects in subsequent proceedings 
with respect to facts necessarily resolved by a criminal jury, 
e.g., Appley v. West, 832 F.2d 1021, 1025-26 (7th Cir. 1987), "a 
guilty verdict, not set aside, binds the sentencing court to 
accept the facts necessarily implicit in the verdict."  United 
States v. Boggi, 74 F.3d 470, 478-79 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting from 
United States v. Weston, 960 F.2d 212, 218 (1st Cir. 1992)).  
Thus, if a defendant has testified that he was elsewhere at the 
time of a robbery, and the jury finds him guilty of that robbery, 
the jury's verdict provides a sufficient basis for a finding by 
the court that the defendant's testimony was false.  If the 
record also provides support for findings that this false 
statement was material and willful and the court so finds, an 
enhancement under  3C1.1 is clearly appropriate. 
   The district court here found by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Moskovits perjured himself at the habeas hearing:  
 
   To obtain a new trial, Moskovits had to convince the 
   court . . . that his testimony was such that it 
   rendered the jury's verdict suspect.  [T]o sustain that 
   heavy burden, Moskovits resorted to perjury.  
   Moskovits' perjury consists of his repeated denial of 
   his involvement in specific events which occurred 
   during the course of the conspiracy." 
(A. 131-2.)  This finding encompasses all of the elements of 
perjury.  Compare Boggi, 74 F.3d at 479 (holding that the 
following finding encompassed all of the elements of perjury: "I 
don't see how, in view of his flat denials and the jury's 
conviction, that you can find otherwise than that he testified 
falsely on the stand."). 
   The district court's conclusion by a preponderance of the 
evidence that all of the elements of perjury are present is well 
supported by the record even though Judge Newcomer was not 
present at the habeas hearing.  Regarding falsity, Moskovits 
testified repeatedly that he was not involved in the cocaine 
distributions alleged in the indictment.  This is evident from 
the transcript of the hearing.  The jury convicted Moskovits of 
distributing cocaine as alleged in the indictment and it 
necessarily resolved this factual issue when it convicted him.  
The district court was bound by this determination and had no 
choice but to conclude that Moskovits' testimony that he was not 
involved in the alleged cocaine distributions was false.  That 
Moskovits may have been able to convince the jury otherwise had 
he testified at trial is irrelevant. 
   Moreover, it is indisputable that this testimony was 
material.  The purpose of the habeas hearing was to determine if 
there was a reasonable probability that by testifying Moskovits 
could have convinced the jury that he was innocent.   As the 
district court observed, Moskovits had a "heavy burden" of trying 
to "convince the court . . . that the jury's verdict [in the 
first trial] was suspect" and he "resorted to perjury" in order 
to carry that burden. 
   Finally, regarding willfulness, given Moskovits' testimony 
"regarding so many facts on which []he could not have been 
mistaken, there is ample support for the District Court's finding 
[of willfulness]."  Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct. at 1117.  The district 
court could make this determination by a preponderance of the 
evidence based on the transcript of the hearing alone.  Moreover, 
the inference of willfulness was more compelling because 
Moskovits did not offer any alternative explanation.  In response 
to the government's argument in favor of a heavier sentence 
reflecting perjury, Moskovits offered no explanation suggesting 
that his testimony was not willful.  On the contrary, he did not 
waiver from the version of events he recounted at the habeas 
hearing. 
 
                               III. 
   I agree with the court that it was error for the district 
court to consider Moskovits' rejection of the government's plea 
offer as an aggravating factor in determining the appropriate 
sentence.  Accordingly, I would reverse and remand for 
resentencing.  I would not, however, limit the district court's 
discretion to a sentence of fifteen years or less. 
